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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the possibility of structuring an Islamic 
option which includes an element of risk sharing as opposed to risk transfer. 
Design/methodology/approach – The approach adopted in this research involved a 
combination of a wa’ad (promise) and murabaha (cost plus sale) and examining if they could 
form a risk-sharing Islamic option. The payoffs were assumed to be dependent on bi-period 
outcomes. 
Findings – The paper attempted to create a hybrid risk-sharing option by combining elements 
of both wa’ad (promise) and murabaha (cost plus sale). The results yielded are dependent on 
the eventual direction of the market (in-the-money, at-the-money and out-the-money). While 
the results are not definitive, they do provide arguments for the adoption of a risk-sharing, as 
opposed to a risk-transfer, methodology when it comes to structuring risk management 
instruments. 
Research limitations/implications – One of the major limitations of this research is the 
inability to assess the Shariah compliance of the proposed instrument. Shariah compliance is 
determined by a Shariah Supervisory Board, and every effort has been made to ensure that 
Shariah financial principles are adhered to in the creation of this structure. 
Practical implications – The structure provides some interest arguments in the creation of 
risk management tools under a Shariah financial framework. The structure illustrates the 
benefits of having a risk-sharing mode over the conventional risk-transfer stances of most 
risk management tools. 
Originality/value – The paper offers a new way of structuring a risk management tool in 
Islamic finance. It explores the highly debated area of derivatives in Islamic finance and 
proposes a new way of creating a risk management tool that involves some elements of risk 
sharing. 
Keywords Risk management, Derivatives, Islamic finance, Financial product design, Risk 
sharing 
Paper type Research Paper 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to engineer and test the structure for a new Islamic risk management 
tool. The focus of many existing risk management tools would be risk transfer and this also 
applies to Islamic risk management tools.  
This paper instead proposes a risk sharing product, based on the spirit of a musharakah or 
partnership agreement, which is essentially a partnership contract where both parties (in this 
case the Bank and the Customer) actively engage in the investment and management aspects 
of the business venture and share profits/losses in accordance to their share in the investment. 
The investment here is the purchase of a commodity at a future date and the product itself is a 
combination of a wa’ad (promise) and murabaha (cost plus sale).  The paper will examine 
and test the viability of this (hybrid) structure along with proposals on pricing and aims at 
contributing to the literature on risk management in the context of Islamic Finance. 
The rationale for this paper is that the rapid growth of Islamic finance in today’s global 
economy has highlighted some weaknesses in the financial system, with risk management 
being an area of emphasis from the need for further development of Islamic risk management 
(see Wilson, 2007; Smorlaski et al, 2006; Maurer, 2001).  
As a matter of fact, the development of risk management strategies within Islamic finance has 
been relatively difficult. There are various reasons for this. First, traditional Islamic risk 
management products were rigid (Rosly and Bakar, 2003). This was due to the constraints 
placed upon innovators by Shariah financial law (Mohamad and Tabatabaei, 2008)  
Second, Ismal, (2010) and Bacha (1999) argue that this lack of development was due to lack 
of robust demand for risk management tools.  
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Third, the lack of a central regulatory board has also impacted the development of risk 
management in Islamic finance (El-Hawary et al, 2004). The Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) and Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) are the two main policy makers and so-called regulatory bodies for Islamic finance 
but even then these standards are only prescribed as opposed to enforced (BMB, 2010). The 
only country with a set of central rules for Islamic financial enterprise is Malaysia who is 
seen as the most lenient and liberally open to Islamic financial policy making. The rules of 
Islamic finance in the Middle East and Islamic states such as Pakistan vary from region to 
region and depend largely on individual religious scholars and their interpretation of the 
Quran. However, Askari et al. (2012) note that: 
“…debate on derivatives will continue in Islamic Finance, but a present they have 
very limited acceptability and it is unlikely that the practice of derivatives will be 
as widespread as seen in conventional markets any time soon. However, as 
Islamic finance grows, its own version of hedging mechanisms and financial 
products with embedded options will emerge. Prohibition of derivatives, however, 
does not preclude an Islamic financial intermediary from designing a risk-sharing 
or risk-mitigating scheme. This can be achieved through the creation of a risk-
mitigating instrument synthetically using existing instruments” (pp. 110-111) 
As a matter of fact, over recent years, the development of Islamic risk management has 
progressed steadily with the creation of new Islamic risk management tools such as the wa’ad 
(promise) and parallel murabaha (cost plus sale) (Ebrahima and Rahmanb, 2005). The 
development of the wa’ad and its support within the Islamic financial community provides 
for an interesting picture on the progress of Islamic financial innovation (Razali, 2008). From 
an Islamic financial standpoint the wa’ad is a contractually binding promise to sell at a 
certain date for a specified price, a structure that is not unlike mainstream call options. The 
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difference being, as opposed to mainstream call options, a wa’ad is legally and contractually 
binding meaning that should the agreement be reneged upon, legal action can be brought 
against the counterparty (Noor and Aripin, 2010). This new instrument clearly pushes the 
boundaries of Shariah-compliance, however it does show the willingness of Shariah finance 
to innovate and develop. Whatever the level of development, the objective of these tools 
would be to provide a strong basis for risk managers to manage risk within the Islamic 
economy.  
This paper hopes to illustrate the processes involved with creating a new shariah-compliant 
tool for risk management. In light with what suggested by Askari et al. (2012) the focus of 
the risk management tool will be on risk sharing as opposed to risk transfer. Risk sharing is 
an important aspect of Islamic finance, although there are differing views on its importance 
and integration within financial instruments in Islamic finance. Supporters of risk sharing 
(Dar and Presley, 2000a) feel that mark-up methods of financing are risk concentrating. 
However, (Homoud, 1985) states that risk sharing is redundant within most financial 
contracts as there are many financing needs with no outcome to share. Finally, there is also a 
third view which adopts a middle ground and suggests that the use of both risk sharing and 
mark-up would depend entirely on the financial situation (Dar and Presley, 2000b; Khan, 
1992; Chapra, 1985). 
It should be known that attempts would be made to keep the new tool in line with Shariah 
principles. However, the principles by which Shariah compliance is determined are based 
upon the rulings of Shariah supervisory board. There are several stipulations pertaining to the 
creation of new risk management tools. These concerns relate to the combination of several 
contracts to achieve a certain payoff as well as the uncertainty of estimating future outcomes. 
Where possible the paper will justify the structure of the contract from a Shariah-compliant 
perspective. 
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Financial innovation in Shariah finance branches out into two subsets. One involves Shariah-
based innovation, which involves the creation of an instrument that is completely Shariah – 
e.g. murabaha or musharakah. The other more along the lines of western financial innovation 
is Shariah-compliant development (Khan, 2010). Shariah-compliant innovation allows for 
some leeway in Shariah interpretation of financial laws, which in turn give some flexibility to 
financial innovators – e.g. a reverse murabaha (BMB, 2010). However, some will argue that 
Shariah-compliant services and products are prohibited and are not truly Shariah (see Derigs 
and Marzban, 2008; DeLorenzo, 2000). 
As opposed to trying to develop a Shariah based product, this research aims to develop a  
Shariah-compliant instrument. However, do note that the validation processes for Shariah-
compliancy and approval can only be achieved through a Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). 
Shariah-compliance has been a recent trend and one can observe its benefits. Trying to, for 
the lack of a better term, amalgamate elements of mainstream finance with little 
diminishment of Shariah principles has provided a strong foundation for innovation and 
development of new products and services within the Islamic financial system. This allows 
Shariah finance to compete on a more level playing field with that of mainstream finance in 
aspects such as risk management and liquidity transfer.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section will illustrate two examples, one of a 
swap and the other of a simple wa’ad. Section 3 will outline the structure of a suggested tool, 
the result of the combination of a wa’ad and a murabaha. Finally, Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
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2. EXAMPLES OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INNOVATION: ISLAMIC PROFIT 
RATE SWAP AND WA’AD 
The ever-growing nature of Shariah finance has resulted in the creation of new Shariah-
compliant products. There is a quickly developing chasm between Shariah-compliance and 
Shariah-based. Much of the Islamic “derivatives” that are available today are derived from 
their more traditional counterparts where mainstream derivatives are, to a certain extent, 
reverse-engineered to fit Shariah-compliance regulations. Many of these Islamic “derivatives” 
involve the use of multiple murabaha (cost-plus financing) and wa’ad (promise) contracts. 
Murabaha contracts, as the translation suggests, is a permitted form of Islamic financing 
where the lender (e.g. bank) buys commodities from a broker and sells this on to the borrower 
at a mark up, who is then able to sell this on to another broker. This is one of the most 
popular forms of Islamic financing and is the foundation of over 70% of Islamic derivatives 
(Wilson, 2007).  
2.1.Islamic profit rate swap 
The most innovative use of a murabaha as an Islamic risk management instrument would be 
as a profit rate swap. These profit rate swaps operate in a similar fashion to interest rate 
swaps where two counterparties exchange fixed rates for floating rates. However, interest in 
this context is considered riba and as such as opposed to swapping interest rates, parties swap 
profit streams instead. The structure of this instrument is described below. 
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Figure 1: Islamic profit rate swap (BMB, 2010) 
The structure illustrated in Figure 1, is a basic Islamic profit rate swap and like its traditional 
counterpart allows the transformation of fixed rate into floating rate and vice versa. This 
structure involves the use of two murabaha contracts – a straight murabaha and a parallel 
reverse murabaha. Steps 1 to 4 involve the straight murabaha where the floating rate payer 
purchases commodities from Broker 1 (Step 1) and sells these on, at a mark-up, to the fixed 
rate payer (Step 2) who then sells them on to Broker 2 (Step 3). The proceeds from the sale of 
the commodities are used to repay the initial murabaha at fixed intervals and with fixed 
amounts (Step 4). This completes the transformation from floating rate to fixed rate. Steps 5 
to 8 illustrate the parallel reverse murabaha. The fixed rate payer purchases commodities 
from Broker 2 (Step 5) and sells these on to the floating rate payer at a mark-up (Step 6). 
These commodities are then sold periodically onto Broker 1 (Step 7) and the proceeds from 
these periodic sales are used to repay the murabaha (Step 8). Whilst in the straight murabaha 
(Steps 1-4) the entire sum of commodities is sold immediately and the loan repaid in fixed 
payments over a period (e.g. every three months), the parallel reverse murabaha (Steps 5-8) 
requires that a portion of the commodities be sold periodically (e.g. 3 months) and 
repayments are made when sale occurs. 
Step 6 
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2.2.Wa’ad 
A wa’ad is a contract that contains a unilateral promise to deliver a commodity at a price 
stipulated today at a future date. Within the realm of Islamic finance a wa’ad is a morally 
binding and enforceable contract. However, the use of the wa’ad, at this point in time, is only 
limited to murabaha commodity contracts (BMB, 2010). The use of a wa’ad in Islamic 
finance is to recreate the payoff and characteristics of a mainstream call option. The structure 
is described below. 
 
Figure 2: Wa’ad (BMB, 2010) 
Party B is afraid of a rise of the price for a particular commodity and enters into a wa’ad 
contract with Party A. This provides Party B with the right to purchase the commodity at a 
point in the future and a specified price and in return Party A is paid a non-refundable fee 
(premium). Should the price rise in the future, Party B would choose to exercise the wa’ad 
and hold Party A to its promise and purchase the commodity at the stipulated price. On the 
other hand should the price fall, Party B can choose not to exercise the wa’ad and purchase 
from the market. In either case, Party A is compensated for providing the service.  
This is fundamentally the Islamic equivalent of a call option and elements such as spot and 
strike prices and premiums behave in similar fashion to their mainstream over-the-counter 
(OTC) equivalents. Moreover, like its mainstream counterpart, the risk management 
emphasis here is on risk transfer as opposed to risk sharing. 
9 
 
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCT 
What would best describe the processes involved with this paper is to create a risk 
management tool that adheres, to the best of our knowledge, to Shariah-compliant standards 
and would adequately perform in the practical world. The main specifications of the 
instrument would involve not only trying to achieve a sufficient hedge but also trying to 
incorporate an emphasis on risk sharing as opposed to risk transfer. With the priority placed 
upon risk sharing as opposed to risk transfer, the basis of the model will stem from the 
musharakah or partnership agreements.  
A basic musharakah is essentially a partnership contract where both parties actively engage in 
the investment and management aspects of the business venture. The distribution of profits or 
losses in this context is based on the contributions to the business venture of each partner. It 
is important to stress that contribution could take the form of expertise, management and 
capital injection. Like most Islamic financial contracts, the profit(or loss) sharing ratio will be 
decided initially within a master agreement to avoid problems of gharar. The structure of the 
musharakah is given below. 
 
Figure 3: Musharakah (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) 
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Both Party 1 and 2 agree to enter into a musharakah contract. The agreement to this 
musharakah will set out the proportion of investment that each party decides to include. The 
ratio of investment by each party will also determine the profit/loss that is shared amongst the 
two parties.  
Under this agreement, two parties form a partnership, under which profits and losses are 
shared out in a specified ratio. In its standard form it is not entirely a risk management tool 
and does not provide institutions with a hedging instrument but rather a way to share risk. 
Could this principle be applied within the spectrum of a partnership option where the call 
option writer shares the risk with the call option buyer? So how do we achieve this risk-
sharing mode of risk management? One possible model is illustrated below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Hybrid structure combining wa’ad and murabaha contracts 
The designations of the parties in the structure above are as follows:    
- Party 1: Bank – organizer of the structure 
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- Party 2: Customer – requires protection from price increases and seeks coverage from 
bank 
- Party 3: Wa’ad seller – facilitates the option element in the structure 
Summary of symbols: 
- 0: Party 1’s share of amount of commodity to be purchased 
- 1: Party 2’s share of amount of commodity to be purchased 
- 1: Premium for wa’ad (in some instances it could also be a down payment) 
- S0: spot price at time T0 
- S1: spot price at time T1 
- 1: cost plus mark-up price of murabaha  (let set it equal to S0 + 
1
) 
- Q1: exercise price of wa’ad  (clearly above S0, but could include/ not include 
1
 if this 
is a down payment) 
Party 2 is afraid of a rise in prices and wishes to protect itself. Within this hybrid contract, 
Party 2 contacts Party 1 to organise a structure for protection against a rise in prices. Under 
the stipulations of this contract, both Party 1 and Party 2 enter into an agreement to share the 
costs and benefits of a wa’ad that is purchased from Party 3. The cost of the wa’ad (1) is 
split between Party 1 and Party 2 based on a predetermined ratio (0: 1) with exercise price 
(Q
1
). This ratio will also determine the spilt for the amount of tangible goods should the 
wa’ad be exercised.  
At the same time, a murabaha is set up between Party 1 and Party 2 whereby it is agreed that 
at the expiry of the wa’ad option, Party 1 will sell its proportion of the commodity at cost 
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plus some mark-up, which we set, without loss of generalisation as equal to 1 = S0 + 
1
, the 
same as the premium of the wa’ad. Apart from simplifying the algebra, both the mark-up and 
the premium will be known (and set) at the same time T0 and will enable the direct 
comparison of the hybrid product, with a straight murabaha and a straight wa’ad. This will be 
regardless of whether the wa’ad is exercised. Moreover, to adhere to the principles of Islamic 
finance the bank will purchase its share (0) of the commodity at time T0 at price S0 and 
retain ownership of it until T1.  
Should the wa’ad not be exercised, Party 1 will then pass its share of the commodity onto 
Party 2 for the agreed price inclusive of a mark-up (S0 + 
1), whereas if the wa’ad is 
exercised, then Party 1 (the bank) will purchase its share (0) of the commodity from Party 3, 
but sell it at S1 onto the market, while passing the commodity already in its possession onto 
Party 2. 
3.1.Payoffs for each of the parties 
The following paragraphs will illustrate the model in two different scenarios. It should be 
noted that this structure is for a call option and as such Party 2 is afraid of a rise in prices
1
. 
Scenario 1: For S1   > Q
1. Party 2 is going to exercise the wa’ad. 
Payoffs at time T0: 
- Party 1 pays premium to Party 3 = 0 1 
- Party 2 pays premium to Party 3 = 1 1 
- Party 1 (the bank) purchases 0 of the commodity at S0  
Payoffs at time T1: 
                                                 
1
 Note that the ratio split, 0 + 1, will always equal to 1 or 100%. 
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- wa’ad is exercised 
- Party 1 takes delivery of commodity and pays Party 3 = 0 Q1 
- Party 1 sells its portion of the commodity onto Party 2 at cost plus some mark-up = 0 
X
1
 or 0  (S0 + 
1
) 
- Party 1 sells its portion 0 of the commodity at the spot price S1 
- Party 2 takes delivery of commodity and pays Party 3 = 1 Q1 
Scenario 2: For S1 < Q
1. Party 2 is not going to exercise the wa’ad. 
Payoffs at time T0: 
- Party 1 pays premium to Party 3 = 01 
- Party 1 (the bank) purchases 0 of the commodity at S0  
- Party 2 pays premium to Party 3 = 11 
Payoffs at time T1: 
- wa’ad is not exercised 
- Party 1 sells its proportion of commodity to Party 2  
at cost plus some mark-up = 0 X1 or 0  (S0 + 
1
) 
- Party 2 purchases commodity from spot market = 1S1 
- Party 3 sells commodity on the spot market at S1 
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The tables below provide a better illustration of the payoffs for each party in each scenario
2
. 
Table 1 and Figure 5 below indicate the payoffs for the Bank (Party 1). Figure 5 is the 
pictorial representation for the payoffs for Party 1 (the Bank) to provide the reader with a 
better illustration of how the hybrid structure works. 
Party 1  
(Partner Bank) 
Scenario 1:  
For S1   > Q
1 
 wa’ad is exercised  
Party 1 (Partner Bank) 
Party 1  
(Partner Bank) 
Scenario 2:  
For S1   < Q
1 
 wa’ad NOT exercised  
T0: pay premium to Party 3 
-01 
Purchase 0 of commodity 
-0S0 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-01 
Purchase 0 of commodity 
-0S0 
T1: -
0
Q
1 
+ 0(S0 + 
1
) + 0S1 T1: +
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: +0(S1 - Q
1
) NET:  0 
Table 1: Payoffs for Party 1 (Partner Bank) under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2  
                                                 
2
 Please note that a negative sign denote expenditure, while a positive sign denotes revenue. Costs of storage 
involved in the actual physical ownership of the commodity have not been incorporated. 
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Figure 5: Option Payoff for the Bank (Party 1) 
 
 
Figure 5 indicates the payoff for the Bank (Party 1). What can be seen is that if S1 < Q
1
, Party 
1 will not exercise the wa’ad and will not buy the commodity from Party 3. However, Party 1 
will have paid the premium (01) to Party 3 and will have purchased its own share of the 
commodity, with a view to selling it onto Party 2, which the bank will do for the mark-up, set 
exactly at the price (S0 + 
1
). In this case, the net outcome is zero. 
If S1 > Q
1
, Party 1 will exercise the wa’ad and will buy, its own share of the commodity from 
Partner 3. This will then be sold to Partner 2. However, the bank still has ownership of 0 of 
the commodity, paid S0 at T0. The bank can now sell it for a profit equal to 
0
(S1 - Q
1
), which 
is the ratio split for the bank multiplied by the difference between the spot price at expiry and 
the exercise price of the wa’ad 
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Party 2 (Customer) 
Scenario 1:  
For S1   > Q
1 
 wa’ad is exercised  
Party 2 (Customer) 
Scenario 2:  
For S1   < Q
1 
 wa’ad NOT exercised  
T0: pay premium to Party 3 
-11 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-11 
T1:  -
1
Q
1 
- 0(S0 + 
1
) T1: -
1
S1 - 
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: -1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -0S0 
Or 
-(1Q1 + 1 + 0S0) 
NET: -1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 -0S0 
Or 
-(1S1 + 
1 
+ 0S0) 
Table 2: Payoffs for Party 2 (Customer) under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2  
 
 
Figure 6: Net cost of the option for the Customer (Party 2) 
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Figure 6 and Table 2 above highlight the payoffs of the Customer (Party 2). It is worth 
remembering that Partner 2 is afraid that the price of the commodity could increase. By 
engaging in this hybrid product, the net cost of the overall contract for the customer when S1   > 
Q
1
 is constrained at -1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -0S0, while when S1   < Q
1
 the cost is -1S1 - (
0
 + 
1) 1 -0S0.  
Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) 
  Scenario 1:  
For S1   > Q
1 
 wa’ad is exercised 
Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) 
Scenario 2:  
For S1   < Q
1 
 wa’ad NOT exercised 
T0: receive premia from Party 1 and Party 
2   
+01 + 11 
T0: receive premia from Party 1 and party 
2  
+01 + 11 
T1: honour promise to sell commodity at 
Party 1 and Party 2 at agreed price Q
1 
+0Q1 + 1Q1 
Purchase (0 + 1) of commodity 
-(0 + 1) S1 
T1: wa’ad NOT exercised 
 
NET:  
(0 + 1) 1 + (0 + 1) Q1- (0 + 1) S1 
Or 
1 + Q1- S1 
NET:  
(0 + 1) 1  
Or 
 1  
Table 3: Payoffs for Party 3 (wa’ad seller) Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 with NO 
requirement for ownership of commodity 
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Figure 7: Payoff of the option for the wa’ad seller (Party 3) with NO requirement for 
owning commodity 
 
As it is not clear whether the wa’ad requires continued ownership of the commodity, we 
distinguish between the two cases. In the first case, illustrated by Table 3 and Figure 7, we 
present the payoffs of the wa’ad seller with no requirement for ownership of the commodity, 
while Table 4 and Figure 8 will present the payoffs of the wa’ad seller if there is a 
requirement for ownership of the commodity.  
In the case of no requirement for ownership, as illustrated in Table 3 and Figure 7, when the 
wa’ad is exercised (S1   > Q
1
), Party 3 (the seller of the wa’ad) will receive the premium 1 
upfront and then Q
1
. However, Party 3, to honour the wa’ad, will have to buy the commodity 
at the prevailing price S
1
.
 
In this scenario Party 3 may face an unlimited loss equal to 1+ Q1 
– S1 as S1
 
increases. 
However, if S1 < Q
1 
and the wa’ad is not exercised, Party 3 will gain the premium 1 paid up 
front.  
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Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) 
Scenario 1: For S1   > Q
1 
 wa’ad is exercised 
Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) 
Scenario 2: For S1   < Q
1 
 wa’ad NOT exercised 
T0: receive premia from Party 1 and Party 2  
+01 + 11 
Purchase (0 + 1) of commodity 
-(0 + 1) S0 
T0: receive premia from Party 1 and Party 2  
+01 + 11 
Purchase (0 + 1) of commodity 
-(0 + 1) S0 
T1: honour promise to sell commodity at 
Party 1 and Party 2 at agreed price Q
1
 
+(0 + 1) Q1  
T1: sell commodity at spot price S1 
+(0 + 1) S1 
NET: +(0 + 1) 1  + (0 + 1) Q1 - (0 + 1) S0 
Or 
+1  + Q1 - S0 
NET:  +(0 + 1)(S1-S0) + (
0 
+ 1) 1 
Or 
(S1-S0) + 
1
 
Table 4: Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 for Party 3 (Wa’ad seller) WITH requirement for 
ownership of commodity 
 
 
Figure 8: Payoff of the option for the wa’ad seller (Party 3) WITH requirement for 
ownership of commodity 
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Table 4 and Figure 8 present the payoffs for the wa’ad seller with the requirement for 
ownership of the commodity. In this case, Party 3 (the seller of the wa’ad) will at time T0 
receive the premium 1, but also will need to purchase the commodity at S0. Under Scenario 
1 (the wa’ad is exercised i.e. S1   > Q
1
), to honour the wa’ad, Party 3 will sell the commodity 
at Q
1
. The profit for Party 3, who already owns the commodity, which was purchased at T0 at 
the prevailing price S0, is equal to 
1
  + [Q
1 
- S0]. This profit is clearly larger than zero and is 
constant when S1   > Q
1
. Please note that to facilitate the understanding of the diagram, 
exceptionally, Q
1
 (the strike price) was set equal to S0. 
However, if S1 < Q
1 and the wa’ad is not exercised, Party 3 will gain the premium 1 paid 
upfront at T0, but will also need to buy the commodity at S0 and then re-sell it at S1. The 
benefits of this structure for Party 3 will depend greatly on the price at which they are able to 
purchase the commodity and then re-sell it onto the market at S1. The losses for Party 3 in 
this case can be explained by the formula 1 + S1 –S0. 
 
However, even in the case that the 
price of the commodity should fall to zero (S1 =0), its losses would be limited to 
1 –S0. 
It is possible to draw some conclusions from the above analysis. Party 1, the bank, benefits if 
the price of the commodity increases. This nicely complements the fear of Party 2, who is 
afraid of a price raise. Therefore, they can mutually benefit from the partnership. In case of 
Party 3 (the wa’ad seller) it looks as if it would be better off by actually owning the 
commodity from T0. In this case, the worst scenario is a fall in the price of the commodity, 
but the loss would be known in advance with a clear limit, unlike in the case of no ownership, 
where a price raise could potentially force unlimited losses upon Party 3.  
Further interesting comments may be drawn by comparing the case when the combined 
strategy (wa’ad plus murabaha with sharing) with a straight wa’ad and no sharing. 
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Comparison with straight wa’ad  (no sharing no murabaha) from the point of view of Party 2 
(customer) 
Straight wa’ad 
(wa’ad exercised) 
Straight wa’ad 
(wa’ad NOT 
exercised) 
Combined product 
(wa’ad exercised) 
Combined product 
(wa’ad NOT 
exercised) 
T0: pay premium to 
Party 3 
-(0 + 1) 1 
T0: pay premium 
to Party 3 
-(0 + 1) 1 
T0: pay premium to 
Party 3 
-11 
T0: pay premium to 
Party 3 
-11 
T1: EXERCISED 
-(0 + 1) Q1 
T1: NOT 
EXERCISED 
-(0 + 1) S1 
T1:  -
1
Q
1 
- 0(S0 + 
1
) T1: -
1
S1 - 
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: 
-(0 + 1) 1- (0 + 1) 
Q
1 
Or 
-(1 + Q1) 
NET: 
-(0 + 1) 1 - (0 
+ 1) S1 
Or 
-(1 + S1) 
NET: 
-1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
Or 
-(1Q1 + 1 + 0S0) 
NET: 
-1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
Or 
-(1S1 + 
1 
+ 0S0) 
Table 5: Comparison with straight wa’ad  (no sharing no murabaha) from the point of 
view of Party 2 (customer) 
It is possible to see from Table 5 above that in the case that the wa’ad is exercised Party 2 
(customer) is better off in the combined product because the (absolute value of the) net 
outcome (expenditure) of the combined product when the wa’ad is exercised is: 
| -1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 - 0S0| which is less than |-(
0 
+ 1) 1 - (0 + 1) Q1| as S0 is less than 
Q
1
 
However, Party 2 (customer) is NOT better off with the combined product, when the wa’ad is 
NOT exercised, because the (absolute value of the) net outcome is: 
| -1S1 - (
0 
+ 1) 1 - 0S0 | that is less than | -(
0
 + 1) 1 - (0+1) S1| as S1 is less than S0 
Although we ignore the inter-temporal analysis, it should be noted that Party 2 is paying less 
at T0 in terms of the premium (i.e.  -
11 instead of – (0 + 1) 1 of the straight murabaha) 
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Comparison with no sharing (straight murabaha) from the point of view of Party 2 (customer) 
Straight murabaha 
Combined product 
(Wa’ad exercised) 
Combined product 
(Wa’ad NOT exercised) 
T0: agree sale for mark-up 
 (S0 + 
1
) 
T0: pay premium to Party 3 
-11 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-11 
T1: -(0 + 1)(S0+
1
) T1:  -
1
Q
1 
- 0(S0 + 
1
) T1: -
1
S1 - 
0
(S0 + 
1
) 
NET: -(0 + 1)(S0+
1
) 
Or 
-(S0 + 
1
)
 
 
NET: -1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
Or 
-1Q1 - 1 -0S0 
NET: -1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 -
0S0 
Or 
-1S1 - 
1 
-0S0 
Table 6 Comparison with no sharing (straight murabaha) from the point of view of 
Party 2 (customer) 
The comparison with a straight murabaha shows that the customer is worse off when the 
price increases and the wa’ad is exercised because Q1 is larger than S0: 
|-1Q1 - (0 + 1) 1 - 0S0| > | -(
0
 + 1)(S0 + 
1
)| or after some simplification |–1Q1| > |-
a
1
S0| 
The comparison with a straight murabaha shows that the customer is better off when the price 
decreases and the wa’ad is NOT exercised: 
|-(0 + 1) (S0 + 
1
)| > |-1S1 - (
0
 + 1) 1 - 0S0| or after some simplification |–
1
S0| > |-
1S1| 
In other words, when the price increases, Party 2 is worse off in comparison to a straight 
murabaha (with no sharing). In partial mitigation, it must be said that the (relative) loss is 
constrained at Q
1 
and a smaller share in the project (1) would further reduce these losses.  
However, when the price falls, Part 2 will benefit, depending on whether S1 < S0. 
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Comparison with no sharing (straight murabaha) from the point of view of Party 1 (bank) 
Straight murabaha 
Combined product 
(Wa’ad exercised) 
Combined product 
(Wa’ad NOT exercised)) 
T0: agree sale for mark-up 
(S0 + 
1
) 
Purchase commodity at 
-(0 + 1) S0 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-01 
Purchase 0 of commodity 
-0 S0 
T0: pay premium to Part 3 
-01 
Purchase 0 of commodity 
-0 S0 
T1: +(
0
 + 1)(S0+
1
) T1: -
0
Q
1
+0(S0+
1
)+ 0S1 T1: +
0
(S0+
1
) 
NET: +(0 + 1) 1 
Or 
1 
NET: +0(S1- Q
1
) NET:  0 
Table 7 Comparison with no sharing (straight murabaha) from the point of view of 
Party 1 (bank) 
Finally, as shown in Table 7, the comparison with a straight murabaha, from the point of 
view of the bank, reveals a complex pattern. The bank secures a guaranteed mark-up (0 + 1) 
1 in the case of the murabaha. The outcome of the combined product, as already explained, 
depends on the size of the movement of the price of the commodity at time T1 (S1) and the 
agreed exercise price for the wa’ad. In the case where the wa’ad is exercised (i.e. S1   > Q1), 
the comparison depends on the size of 1, S1 and Q
1
 to establish whether  
+(0 + 1) 1 > + 
0
(S1 - Q
1
) or +(0 + 1) 1 < + 
0
(S1 - Q
1
)   
The bank, however, has a zero outcome from the hybrid product when S1 < Q1 and the wa’ad 
is NOT exercised: 
(0 + 1) 1 > 0  
In the case the wa’ad is not exercised, therefore, the bank is clearly worse off in comparison 
to a straight murabaha.  
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To sum up and in partial mitigation to the above conclusions, which seem to indicate that the 
bank does not have much incentive in setting up the hybrid structure, the bank can be better 
off the larger the difference between S1 and Q
1
as the value of 1 (the premium for the wa’ad) 
is known in advance and can be recouped as the mark-up. It should also be noted that the 
hybrid product involves ownership (at of only 0 of the commodity and not the entire (0 + 
1) envisaged by the straight murabaha.  
Few considerations  
1) Firstly, whilst the researchers feel that the use of risk sharing is more in line with 
Shariah principles, there are grounds on which to argue that the purchase of 
commodities does not amount to a plausible investment. The use of a musharakah and 
wa’ad in this manner may make it non-Shariah-complaint if it is deemed that there is 
no active management of the investment sum to justify the partnership in the first 
place. 
2) Secondly, admittedly it is a complicated method to structure an option. The want for 
risk sharing has meant that one additional party had to be included into the contact in 
what would otherwise be achieved with a straightforward wa’ad.  
3) Thirdly, the inclusion of Party 3, which accounts for the wa’ad element of the 
structure, creates additional uncertainty. Islamic finance requires proof of ownership 
of commodities before any sale can take place. Where possible, the structure has 
taken into account ownership of commodities before sale but the wa’ad element 
creates subjectivity as to whether ownership is required before the agreement of the 
wa’ad contract.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed some of the issues regarding the use and development of risk 
management tools within the context of Islamic Finance. This paper has also attempted to 
suggest a possible development by applying the principle of musharakah (shared investment) 
to a combination of a wa’ad contract to a murabaha contract. 
The combination of a wa’ad and a murabaha contract to create a hybrid risk-sharing approach 
to financial risk management has yielded mixed results when compared to straightforward 
wa’ad and murabaha contracts.  
Comparing the hybrid product to either a straight murabaha or a straight wa’ad from the point 
of view of the customer produces a mixed picture. When compared to the wa’ad alone, the 
hybrid contract was more beneficial to the customer when it was in the money but less when 
out of the money. Vice versa, when the hybrid was compared to a straight murabaha, it was 
less beneficial on the upside but was cheaper when the contract was out of the money. 
Similarly, a comparison of the hybrid product to either a straight murabaha or a straight 
wa’ad from the point of view of the bank shows that the bank is slightly worse off, although 
the picture is a little bit mixed picture, depending on the behaviour of the price of the 
commodity at T1. 
In conclusion, this study set out to explore the scope of incorporating risk sharing within risk 
management option-like tools under a Shariah financial framework and whilst the results do 
not provide a definitive argument of the advantages, they do illustrate certain benefits of risk-
sharing methodologies within financial instruments such as that of premiums and down 
payments. 
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Glossary of Islamic Financial Terms 
Islamic Finance Terms Interpretation 
Riba 
Usury or excessive interest 
- Riba in this context would also 
include selling money for money 
Gharar Excessive uncertainty 
Maysir 
Gambling 
- Maysir is thought to be a product 
of gharar 
Halal Permitted by the Quran 
Murabaha Cost-plus financing contract 
Musharakah Partnership contract 
Wa’ad Legally binding promise 
 
 
 
 
